Mathematical Modeling of Business Reopening when Facing SARS-CoV-2
  Pandemic: Protection, Cost and Risk by Miao, Hongyu et al.
1 
 
A key question to business owners facing SARS-CoV-2 pandemics: 
When to reopen my business? 
 
Hongyu Miao1*, Qianmiao Gao1, Han Feng1, Chengxue Zhong1, Pengwei Zhu1, Liang Wu1, Michael D. 
Swartz1, Xi Luo1, Stacia M. DeSantis1, Dejian Lai1, Cici Bauer1, Adriana Pérez1, David Lairson2 
 
1 Department of Biostatistics and Data Science 
2 Department of Management, Policy and Community Health 
School of Public Health, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston 
1200 Pressler St., Houston, TX, 77030 
 
* Corresponding Author 
Email: hongyu.miao@uth.tmc.edu 
   
Abstract  
The sudden onset of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has resulted in tremendous loss of human 
life and economy in more than 210 countries and territories around the world. While self-protections such 
as wearing mask, sheltering in place and quarantine polices and strategies are necessary for containing 
virus transmission, tens of millions people in the U.S. have lost their jobs due to the shutdown of 
businesses. Therefore, how to reopen the economy safely while the virus is still circulating in population 
has become a problem of significant concern and importance to elected leaders and business executives. 
In this study, mathematical modeling is employed to quantify the profit generation and the infection risk 
simultaneously from the point of view of a business entity. Specifically, an ordinary differential equation 
model was developed to characterize disease transmission and infection risk. An algebraic equation is 
proposed to determine the net profit that a business entity can generate after reopening and take into 
account the costs associated of several protection/quarantine guidelines. All model parameters were 
calibrated based on various data and information sources. Sensitivity analyses and case studies were 
performed to illustrate the use of the model in practice.      
 
Keywords: SARS-CoV-2 pandemics; mathematical modeling; reopening business; benefit-cost-risk 
trade-off.  
 
Background  
Severe Acute respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) is an ongoing global health threat to 
every country in the world and has caused significant loss of almost every business entity.1-3 In the United 
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States alone, as of May 14, 2020, more than 1.3 million confirmed infections and more than 84,000 
deaths have been reported since the COVID-19 outbreak, which is associated with a 4.8% drop in gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of 2020. While the development of effective vaccination,  
treatment and prevention strategies is underway, it is still unknown when such efforts will yield clinical 
and medical practices effective enough to allow a return to usual economic activity.4,5 Practicing a variety 
of stringent quarantine and shutdown policies is an effective way to protect our citizens’ health and lives 
during a pandemic like SARS-CoV-2.6 However, there are costs that need to be considered. Besides the 
extraordinary physical and emotional stress and potentially large medical expenses that COVID patients 
and their families must cope with, a large number of people have lost (or may lose) their jobs or 
businesses. This significant financial loss results in a pressure to reopen the economy prior to the 
availability of effective vaccination and treatment of COVID-19. Elected leaders and business executives 
as well as employees must address a critical question: how to reopen the economy in the midst of a 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic safely?   
In this study, we use mathematical modeling techniques to address particular challenges a business entity 
may face during reopening. In recognition that mathematical modeling results alone cannot stop 
pandemics,7 the following behavioral and social guidelines are still strongly suggested for any business 
entities in planning to reopen: 
1. Social distancing (including dinning in restaurants and manufacturing in factories), e.g., the 
number of workers (and clients or patrons) that a business environment can support while 
maintaining a 6ft distance between individuals; 
2. Mask, glove, and goggle wearing while not alone; 
3. Routine sanitization (e.g., entrance, exit, home, workplace, conference room, bathroom, public 
transportation, door knobs, shared electronic devices); 
4. COVID-19 tests accessible to workers who have symptoms or recent exposure to confirmed 
infections; 
5. Deployment of non-contact sensors (e.g., Kinsa smart thermometer) for real-time fever detection 
and location; 
6. Case reporting and quarantine policy; 
7. Determination of a maximum time duration of exposure to working environment; 
8. Specific equipment (e.g., stronger ventilation system, UV purification system) for aerosol 
transmission prevention; 
9. Employees in non-contact positions remain working from home; 
 
The implementation of each guideline above can protect employees’ health and lives but may add an 
economic cost. Indeed, the main purpose of reopening businesses is to prevent further deterioration of our 
economy by generating profits and provide incomes that many citizens desperately need. However, for 
employees in a contact-based position, the risk of COVID infection and transmission may remarkably 
increase if they return to work. When the infection rate of COVID-19 within a business entity becomes 
higher than the prevalence in the general population, it may trigger a domino effect and subsequent 
infections in a larger community originated from this business entity. Therefore, a delicate balance 
between profit/income generation and infection/transmission prevention must be the ideal. The focus of 
this modeling strategy is  to provide a quantitative tool for investigating whether a business entity can 
generate positive net profit after reopening while keeping the prevalence of COVID-19 infection within 
this entity less than or equal to the prevalence in the general population. The prevalence in the general 
population is assumed to remain under a certain threshold after reopening; otherwise, isolation and 
quarantine orders may be re-issued by government and reopening would halt.  
3 
 
 
Methods 
Mathematical Model 
To our knowledge, there exist only a few studies that have modeled the reopening of a country, a state, a 
city or a local community,8-11 and fewer studies have focused on the reopening of a business entity. This 
modeling work attempts to address the business-reopening problem by considering a transmission model 
together with a net profit equation.  
Borrowing from the classical susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) modeling framework as in several 
previous models,8,12 the following definitions and notations are introduced. Let 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 denote the total 
number of employees in a business entity, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 denote the number of employees in a contact-based 
position, and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 denote the number of employees in a non-contact position. Employees in a non-contact 
position are expected to remain working from home (WFH) according to Guideline #9 and thus are 
excluded from the transmission model. These WFH employees still actively contribute to profit 
generation and are counted in the net profit equation. In addition, the total number of employees 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 is 
assumed variable after the reopening due to various reasons, including infection-related death or other 
factors. Among the 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 employees in a contact-based position, let 𝑆𝑆 denote the number of susceptible 
employees; 𝐶𝐶 denote the number of asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and very-mildly-symptomatic 
(VMS) carriers (collectively known as silent spreaders); 𝑄𝑄 denote the number of infected employees on 
quarantine, under treatment (i.e., confirmed infection) or awaiting test result (i.e., unconfirmed infection); 
and 𝐷𝐷 denote the number of deaths or resignations due to infection. Note that: i) all infected employees 
confirmed by virus tests should be quarantined immediately, and any company fellow having a recent 
contact with the infected person is assumed to also be tested for the virus and initially be self-quarantined 
(see Guideline #4). The asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, and very-mildly-symptomatic carriers are the 
three major categories of the so-called “silent spreaders”.13  While it remains unclear how quickly 
asymptomatic carriers can transmit the infection, some studies in China (ref) suggested that 
approximately 25% of those who tested positive without symptoms continued symptomless, and the 
remaining 75% turned out to be pre-symptomatic.14 Other ongoing studies suggested that the proportion 
of asymptomatic infection could be as high as 50%.15 People with very mild symptoms (e.g., occasional 
light cough or mild fever) may not recognize the infection but are also fully capable of spreading the 
disease like the presymptomatic carriers.16 Finally, the WFH employees may still be infected and then 
practice at-home quarantine or receive treatment in hospital; for simplicity, instead of introducing another 
set of equations for characterizing the WFH transmission, the number of infected WFH employees 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is 
assumed to be collected by the business entity on a self-reported basis and directly accounted for in the 
net profit calculation equation.   
 
After taking silent spreaders into consideration,17 the proposed model structure is given below: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= −𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅 ∙ 𝑆𝑆 − 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑆𝑆 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 ∙ (1−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑆𝑆,                                                     (1) 
𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅 ∙ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 ∙ (1−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑆𝑆 − 𝜏𝜏 ∙ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 + 𝜔𝜔 ∙ 𝑄𝑄,                 (2) 
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜏𝜏 ∙ (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 − (𝛾𝛾 + 𝜔𝜔) ∙ 𝑄𝑄 − 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝑄𝑄,                                                             (3) 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑄𝑄,                                                                                                              (4) 
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝛿𝛿 ∙ 𝑄𝑄,                                                                                                              (5) 
and the net profit is defined as the following: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 = 𝜉𝜉1 ∙ 𝜉𝜉7 ∙ 𝜌𝜌 ∙ �(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) + 𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑅𝑅� − ∑ 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 ∙ (𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖≠1or 7 − 𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝑄𝑄 − 𝑤𝑤 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,    (6) 
where 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑅𝑅 denotes the number of employees in contact-based positions who are working on 
site. The definitions of all model variables and parameters are listed in Table 1, and a diagram (Fig. 1) is 
also given to illustrate the transmission model mechanisms and assumptions. As suggested in Fig. 1 and 
Eq. (1), susceptible employees can be infected and become virus carriers by contacting people outside of 
the business at a rate 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂, or interacting with asymptomatic carriers within the business at a rate 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 and 
with presymptomatic and VMS carriers within the business at a rate 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃. Also, 𝛼𝛼 denotes the proportion of 
asymptomatic carriers among all tested-positive infections, and 𝜅𝜅 denote the probability of transmission 
via an average number of contacts per day of one person with other persons. In Eq. (2), the infected 
susceptible become asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic or VMS carriers, and those pre-symptomatic and 
VMS carriers further progress to symptomatic infections at a rate 𝜏𝜏. In Eq. (3),  symptomatic infections 
may recover at a rate 𝛾𝛾 and become immune to virus infection due to, e.g., memory immunity,18 regress to 
symptomless carriers (e.g., some patients can test positive and shed viruses after symptoms end19) at a rate 
𝜔𝜔, or die at a rate 𝛿𝛿. Also, Eqns. (4) and (5) characterize the dynamics of recovered and death, 
respectively. In the net profit Eq. (6), 𝜌𝜌 denotes the net profit per day generated by healthy WFH, 
susceptible, and silent carrier employees, 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 ≠ 1,7) is the average cost per person per day in a contact-
based position associated with the 𝑖𝑖-th protection Guideline (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,9), and 𝑤𝑤 is the average wage per 
day per person for employees on quarantine or under treatment. It is assumed that employees on 
quarantine or under treatment still receive their wages given that the typical quarantine or treatment 
length is 14-28 days even considering them as sick days.  
 
Data Source and Parameter Values 
The datasets generated from recently published studies and surveys are heterogeneous in terms of 
population demographics, geospatial characteristics, medical resource availability, treatment regimens, 
prevention polices and implementation, among others. Extraordinary efforts are needed to integrate such 
heterogeneous datasets and perform a variety of statistical analyses, which is beyond the scope of this 
study. Instead, the summary statistics or previously-calibrated parameter values from previous studies and 
surveys are used as the primary information sources for our model parameter calibration. Note that studies 
reported different accuracy (in terms of decimals), it is thus difficult to standardize the number of 
decimals without losing accuracy so we keep the original numbers. 
To calibrate the transmission model parameters in Eq. (1)-(5), we started with the case death rate and the 
recovery time. In the United States, the case fatality rate is currently 5.65% while Omer et al. (2020) 20 
previously estimated the infection-related death rate as low as 1.7%. In other countries, the reported case 
death rates may range from 0.56% (Iceland) to 13.53% (Italy);20-22 to preserve parameter uncertainty, this 
wide range is adopted in our calculations. To calculate the mean recovery time, we consider the following 
observations:23 i) 8 out of 10 infected persons with symptoms have only mild illness; ii) the average 
recovery time for mild cases is about 2 weeks; iii) for severe cases, recovery may take up to 6 weeks; iv) 
the overall recovery rate is between 97% and 99.75%. The conservative mean recovery time for all cases 
is thus  1/[�0.8
14
+ 0.2
42
� × 0.97] = 16.65 days among people with symptomatic infections, which is longer 
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than the reported median hospitalization period of 12 days 24 among survivors. It was also reported that 
the recovery time for mild cases can be as short as 7 days, therefore, this study assumes that recovery time 
ranges from 7 to 42 days.25  
In Eq. (1), for the proportion of asymptomatic carriers (denoted by α), multiple studies have been 
conducted to estimate this parameter among different populations with different methods.15,26-29 The range 
of the estimate of 𝛼𝛼� is (13.8%, 75%), and about half of such studies reported a result around 50%. Sun et 
al. (2020) 26 analyzed 391 cases in Zhejiang Province, China from Jan. 20th, 2020 to Feb. 10th, 2020, and 
found 54 (13.8%) cases were asymptomatic. Nishiura et al. (2020) 29 estimated α in the evacuated 
Japanese citizens to be 30.8% (95% CI: 7.7-53.8%). Mizumoto et al. (2020) 15 obtained an estimate 
17.9% (95% CI: 15.5-20.2 %) using the data from the Diamond Princess cruise. Kimball et al. (2020) 28 
analyzed the results of symptom assessment and SARS-CoV-2 testing in King County, Washington, and 
found that 56.5% of the tested positive was asymptomatic. Day (2020) 27 suggested that the proportion of 
asymptomatic infection was between 50% and 75% in northern Italy, and others 30 suggested that 𝛼𝛼 could 
be between 25% and 50% on Apr. 5th, 2020.31 
Furthermore, κ  is the probability of one employee having contacts with infected carriers outside a 
business entity, and βO denotes the associated transmission rate. A limited number of studies were found 
helpful for estimating these two parameters, we thus calibrated such parameter values primarily using the 
simulation results from Tang et al. (2020).32 In Tang’s study, the daily average contact number was 
estimated to be 14.78 (SE 0.90) contacts per day per person, and the probability of successful 
transmission per contact was estimated to be 2.10 × 10−8 (SE 1.19 × 10−9). According to the definitions 
of κ and βO, we have βO · κ = 14.78 × 2.10 × 10−8 =  3.10 × 10−7 day−1 , and the range of βO · κ, 
(2.42 × 10−7, 3.88 × 10−7), can be calculated using the standard errors (i.e., 2.42 × 10−7 = (14.78 −2 × 0.90) × (2.10 × 10−8 − 2 × 1.19 × 10−9), and 3.88 × 10−7 = (14.78 + 2 × 0.90) × (2.10 ×10−8 + 2 × 1.19 × 10−9). 
The transmission rate (βP) can be calculated from 
𝑑𝑑0
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,  where 𝑅𝑅0 denotes the reproduction 
number (i.e., the average number of new infections by one carrier) that has been frequently investigated in 
many SARS-CoV-2 studies.14,32-41 For instance, according to the study of Liu et al. (2020),42 the estimated 
𝑅𝑅0 of SARS-CoV-2 in China at the early stage of the pandemic ranges from 1.4 to 6.49 with a mean 3.28 
and a median 2.79. Note that the population in Liu et al. (2020) was mostly not aware of the pandemic 
and used little protections such as mask wearing, hand washing and social distancing. Thus, for the 
unprotected general population, the estimated transmission rate is 3.28/16.65= 0.197 day−1. The 
corresponding range is between 0.0333 (=1.4/42) and 0.927 (=6.49/7) per day. Note that in the early stage 
of a pandemic, it can be assumed that most of the cases are pre-symptomatic or mildly-symptomatic such 
that the parameter value calculated above may be close to the true value of βP. Another study by Li et al. 
(2020)43 suggested that the transmission rate βP could be 1.12 (95% CI: 1.07-1.18), 0.52 (95% CI: 0.42-
0.72), or 0.35 (95% CI: 0.28-0.45) per day by fitting data of different pandemic stages in China. For these 
reasons, we assumed a range for βP of (0.0333, 1.18) per day.  
For the transmission rate of asymptomatic infection (βA), very little useful information was found in the 
scientific literature. Here we borrowed the idea of Li ‘s work,43 in which the transmission rate of 
asymptomatic infection was calculated by multiplying a reduction factor µ with the transmission rate of 
symptomatic infection. The reduction factor µ was estimated as 0.55 (95% CI: 0.46-0.62), 0.50 (95% CI: 
0.37- 0.69) and 0.43 (95% CI: 0.31, 0.61), corresponding to different stages of SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in 
China. Using the same reduction factor µ in our model, βA can be estimated by μβp, leading to a mean of 
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0.197 × 0.5 = 0.099 per day and a range from 0.0103 (= 0.333 × 0.31) to 0.814 (= 1.18 × 0.69) per 
day. 
In Eq. (2), τ is the rate of silent carriers progressing to symptomatic infections. The mean incubation 
period was previously reported to be 5.2 days with a 95% confidence interval (4.1, 7.0) days,14,44 or 5.1 
days with a 95% confidence interval (2.2, 11.5) days.45 Based on these results, we estimated 𝜏𝜏 as the 
reciprocal of the incubation period with a mean 1/5.2=0.192 per day and a 95% confidence interval 
(0.143, 0.244) per day. 
In Eq. (3), for the clearance rate of symptomatic infection 𝛾𝛾 and the death rate due to COVID infection 𝛿𝛿, 
multiple studies developed various methods to estimate them.6,32,46 In Piguillem’s method,6 the 
calculations were mainly based on the case mortality rate and the recovery time. After substituting 16.65 
days for the mean recovery time and 5.65% for the mean death rate aforementioned, we obtain the 
estimate of 𝛾𝛾  as (1 − 0.0565)2/16.65 =0.0535 per day, and the death rate 𝛿𝛿 as (1 − 0.0565) ×
0.0565
16.65 =0.0032 per day. The range of  𝛾𝛾 is found to be (0.0178, 0.141) per day, and the range of δ is 
(1.3 × 10−4, 1.67 × 10−2) per day. 
In Eq. (2) and (3), we also introduced 𝜔𝜔, the rate of regression to carriage, considering the fact that 3.23% 
of the patients recovered from SARS-CoV-2 infection were tested positive after hospital discharge.47,48 
However, the potential infectivity of these carriers remains unclear. Here 𝜔𝜔 is estimated to be 3.23% × 𝛾𝛾�=0.0323×0.0535= 0.00173 per day, and its range is between 0.000575 (=0.0178 × 3.23%) and 
0.00455 (=0.141×3.23%) per day.  
Now consider the additional parameters in the net-profit equation Eq. (6). The average net profit per 
capita 𝜌𝜌 in the U.S. is found to be $400.73 per person per day, which is calculated by dividing Jan 2020 
U.S. corporate profit $1908.02 Billion US dollars 49 by 158,714,000  (the number of employed persons in 
the United States)50 and then by 30 days. The average weekly wage of one employee in the U.S. is $1,093 
per person in the third quarter of Year 2019,51 so the average daily wage of employee 𝑤𝑤 is $218.60 per 
day (dividing $1,109 by the number of weekdays 5). In the previous study of Thumstrom and Newbold 
(2020),12 GDP loss was considered as one cost of social distancing; i.e., an immediate GDP decline 
associated with practicing social distancing alone (i.e., house-hold quarantine) in the United States was 
predicted to be 13.7 − 6.49 = 7.21 trillion US dollars. The projected GDP of Fiscal Year 2020 is 22.11 
trillion US dollars according to the United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO).52 Therefore, for 
Guideline #1, the cost of social distancing is the loss of productivity by 7.21 ÷ 22.11 = 32.6%, and thus 
𝜉𝜉1 = 1 − 32.6% = 67.4%. For Guideline #2, the cost of personal protective equipment (PPE),53 
including surgical mask, gloves, goggle wearing, hand sanitization, and soup, is calculated as 𝜉𝜉2 =$3.60 
per person per day 54 under the assumption that each person will consume two surgical masks per day, 
two pairs of gloves per day, and one goggles. According to the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
guideline from Perdue University,55 goggles can last for years if kept clean by using mild soap and water, 
and if stored in a protected, dry, and temperate storage location. So the use life of goggles is much longer 
than our typical setting for simulation time window length (i.e., 100 days) and the cost of one goggles per 
day is $5 ÷ 100 = $0.05 per day for simplicity. The detailed costs of each PPE item as well as hand 
sanitization and soap can be found from online resources.56,57 For Guideline #3, the cost of routine 
sanitization (e.g., cleaning the workplace, bathroom, and shared electronic devices) is calculated as 𝜉𝜉3 = 
$10.45 per environmental service staff per day.58 Specifically, in the work of White (2019), 11 hospitals 
with a total of 1,700 environmental service staffs, they found to spend $11,308 per week to maintain the 
hygiene by consuming disinfection products. We thus calculate 𝜉𝜉3 using the following equation:  
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𝜉𝜉3 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 ) ÷ 7 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐. 
For Guideline #4, the current policy dictates that the test of COVID is free to the business entity (𝜉𝜉4 =$0 per person per day). For Guideline #5, as the current market prices of a non-contact sensor may 
range from $50 to $100, and one non-contact sensor is required for each worksite. With the assumption of 
having 100 employees per worksite, the cost of deploying non-contact sensor 𝜉𝜉5 is $0.005 to $0.01 per 
person per day for a 100-day time horizon. We assume that Guideline #6 does not cost any money (𝜉𝜉6 =$0 per person per day). For Guideline #7, the cost is proportional to the current maximum working hours 
(i.e., 𝜉𝜉7 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ). In our model, the current maximum working hours is assumed 
to be 70% of the regular working hours.  For Guideline #8, referring to the work of Chen (2013),54 the 
cost of deploying specific equipment for reducing aerosol transmission such as ultraviolet germicidal 
irradiation (UVGI) and high-efficiency particular air (HEPA) filtration are $182.37 and $136.78 per 
person per year, respectively, 𝜉𝜉8 is thus equal to $0.874 per person per day via dividing the total cost of 
the aforementioned equipment by 365 days. Finally, we assume that implementing Guideline #9 does not 
incur any cost (𝜉𝜉9 = $0 per person per day).   
All the parameter definitions, values and ranges are summarized in Table 1. However, it should be 
stressed that the parameter values calibrated above are for heterogeneous populations. More importantly, 
at the early stage of the pandemic, the estimates of certain transmission model parameters (e.g., the 
reproduction number and transmission rates) are expected to be larger due to the absence of protection 
policies and self-protection awareness; and the transmission rates are expected to have a notable drop 
after the implementation of various protection and quarantine strategies (PQS). Such a hypothesis is 
supported by several recent studies, which showed that the overall transmission rates may decrease by 2.1 
to 3.2 fold after implementing PQS. Also, the study of Seto et al. (2003) 59 quantified the odds ratios of 
SARS infection as 13 (95% CI: 3, 60), 2 (95% CI: 0.6, 7), or 5 (95% CI: 1, 19), corresponding to the use 
of masks, gloves or hand-washing, respectively. Thus, the values of certain model parameters (e.g., 
transmission rates) will be different from (e.g., smaller than) the values calibrated in this section after 
implementing Guidelines #1-9, which will be elaborated in the result Section.   
 
Implementation and Computing Configuration 
All the computing codes were implemented in MATLAB® (MathWorks, Natick, MA), and the ordinary 
differential equation (ODE) solver ode15s was employed for solving the transmission model numerically. 
The relative error tolerance was set at 10−7, the absolute error tolerance at 10−7, and the maximum step 
size at 10−2. 
  
Results 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We evaluated the local sensitivity of the transmission model in Eq. (1)-(5). Specifically, we evaluated the 
changes in the model outcome variables (i.e. S, C, Q, R, D) corresponding to a 1% change in one 
parameter value, with the other seven parameter values fixed at their default values as in Table 1. Initial 
values for the sensitivity analysis were set as 299 susceptible and 1 silent carrier which approximated the 
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proportion of infections in the U.S. general population as reported by May 5, 2020. The initial numbers of 
quarantined, recovered, and death were all set as 0 for simplicity. The results were visualized in Figure 
2A, showing that the transmission model was most sensitive to the transmission rate of pre-symptomatic 
and VMS infections (𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃) and the rate of progression to symptomatic infection (𝜏𝜏), and least sensitive to 
the product 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅. Even for the most sensitive parameters, a 1% change in parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 or 𝜏𝜏 resulted in 
a change of less than 5 persons per day in the outcomes throughout a prediction period of 200 days. At the 
end of the 200 days period, all changes in the outcomes reached a plateau or tended to diminish.  The 
percentage changes in the model outcomes corresponding to 1% change in each parameter value are 
shown in Figure 2B. One percentchange in 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 or 𝜏𝜏 corresponded to less than 1.5% change in the 
outcomes. These observations together suggested that the transmission model was not locally sensitive to 
parameter value changes and could make robust predictions. 
 
To evaluate the global sensitivity of this model, the Partial Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 
(PRCC) method 60 was employed. The model parameters were randomly sampled 100 times using the 
Latin hypercube sampling technique over uniform distribution. The range of the uniform distribution for 
the global sensitivity for each model parameter is reported in Table 1. Figure 3, shows the plot of the 
PRCC values (next to the y axis in the figure) between model parameters and ODE outputs against time. 
As suggested in many previous studies, an absolute PRCC value greater than 0.4 was deemed as 
practically significant.61 For the susceptible population (𝑆𝑆), the corresponding subfigure showed that the 
transmission rates 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 and 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 were strongly and negatively (< −0.7) correlated with 𝑆𝑆. This result was 
expected as the higher the transmission rates, the smaller the number of the susceptible persons. Please 
note that the percentage of asymptomatic carriers (𝛼𝛼) was positively correlated with 𝑆𝑆 initially (> 0.4) and 
then became negatively correlated with 𝑆𝑆 at the end (< −0.6). The initial positive correlation between 𝑆𝑆 
and 𝛼𝛼 should not be interpreted as that 𝑆𝑆 will increase when 𝛼𝛼 increases, but that 𝑆𝑆 will decrease less 
when 𝛼𝛼 increases. This will happen when 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝛼𝛼 is less than 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 ∙ (1 − 𝛼𝛼). Around the end of the time 
window of the simulation, a larger 𝛼𝛼 corresponded to a smaller 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆 + 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑅𝑅 due to the increase in 
death, and thus 𝑆𝑆 will decrease more given a smaller 𝑁𝑁 in the denominator at the righthand side of Eq. (1). 
From all the subfigures, the transmission rates 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 and 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 were always found strongly correlated with the 
outcomes while it was not the case for 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅, the value of which was too small to have a substantial 
impact on the outcomes. In addition, parameters 𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜏𝜏 were also found strongly correlated with the 
outcomes, and interventions like more effective drug treatment or vaccination would affect such 
parameter values.   
 
Case Study  
Business executives are strongly recommended to follow the guidelines listed in the Background Section 
to prevent the reopening from causing any exacerbation of the ongoing pandemic. However, practical 
difficulties may arise due to, e.g., insufficiency of budget or medical recourses such that only some of the 
guidelines will be implemented by employers. Through this case study, we illustrated the use of the 
transmission model and the cost equation in different scenarios to evaluate the feasibility of reopening. 
Note that our simulation results were obtained under many assumptions and subject to both model 
structure and parameter value uncertainty; therefore, decisions of business executives should not be made 
solely based on the results presented in this section.    
 
In this case study, we focused on four scenarios: I) none of the nine Guidelines was constantly 
implemented (baseline scenario); II) all Guidelines 1-9 were constantly implemented; III) Guidelines 1, 2, 
3, 4, 6, 9 were constantly implemented; IV) Guidelines 1, 3, 4, 6, 9 were constantly implemented. 
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Scenarios I was the baseline scenario, corresponding to complete devalue of infection risk. Across 
scenarios II-IV, Guidelines 1, 3, 4, 6, 9 were assumed to be always implemented given the necessity and 
indispensability of these five Guidelines to business reopening. Scenario III was designed to be less 
restrictive than Scenario II, considering that some business entities might not have the budget to deploy 
non-contact sensors for real-time fever detection, reduce the number of working hours, or acquire specific 
equipment for aerosol transmission prevention. In Scenario IV, the use of PPE was further dropped to 
account for the possible shortage of such materials on the market. The implementation of behavioral and 
social practice guidelines in Scenarios II-IV led to changes in the values of these three, 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅,  𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴, and 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 , parameters in our transmission model. The other model parameters were assumed not directly affected 
by Guidelines 1-9.  For instance, the recovery rate 𝛾𝛾 primarily depends on subject-specific immunity,  the 
availability, affordability of effective medical intervention and health care, instead of behavioral and 
social practice patterns. For these reasons, we adjusted the values of  𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅,  𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴, and 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 for scenarios II-
IV, respectively, as shown in Table 2. For simplicity, we assumed that the effects of different guidelines 
were independent and remained constant throughout the entire simulation time window. We also assumed 
that after reopening, every employee rigorously followed the guidelines and immediately reported their 
symptoms or infections once identified.   
  
According to the study of Koo et al. (2020), 62  the practice of social distancing together with disease 
testing, reporting and quarantine policy (Guidelines 1, 4, and 6) could reduce the number of infections by 
78.20% (IQR: 59.0-94.4%) compared with the baseline scenario when Ro was 2.5. That is, the 
transmission rates might drop to 1-78.2%=21.80% of their baseline values after implementing Guidelines 
1, 4 and 6. To quantify the effects of wearing mask, glove, goggle and hand washing (Guideline 2) on 
infection transmission, we adopted the results from Seto et al. (2003) 59 and Yin et al. (2004) 63 for severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). In their results, the odds ratio for mask wearing was 13 (95% CI: 3-
60, attack rate 11
83
= 13.25%), for glove wearing was 2 (95% CI: 0.6-7, attack rate 9
133
= 6.77%), for 
hand-washing was 5 (95% CI: 1-19, attack rate 3
17
= 17.65%), and for goggles wearing was 1
0.2 = 5 (95% 
CI: 2.44 − 10, attack rate 61.50%). Correspondingly, the transmission rates might drop to 8.83% (95% 
CI: 1.92-36.56%) for mask wearing, 48.85% (95% CI: 15.17-100%) for glove wearing, 39.37% (95% CI: 
22.40-64.33%) for goggle wearing, and 23.91% (95% CI: 6.32-100%) for hand washing. Thus, due to the 
implementation of Guideline 2, the transmission rates might drop to 8.83% × 48.85% × 39.37% ×23.91% = 0.41% of their baseline values. Zhang et al. (2018) 64 investigated influenza A transmission in 
a student office setting, which showed that the infection risk could reduce by 2.14% with implementation 
of routine sanitization. Routine sanitation is expected to reducethe transmission rates  to 1 − 2.14% =97.86% of their baseline values after implementing Guideline 3. The implementation of Guideline 5 
would improve the implementation of Guidelines 4 and 6 so its effect on infection transmission was not 
explicitly quantified in this study. For Guideline 7, we assumed a linear relationship between the number 
of working hours and the infection risk. The average working hours per day after reopening was assumed 
to be 70% of the regular working hours. Correspondingly, the transmission rates might drop to 70% 
(range 50-100%) with Guideline 7. For Guideline 8, according to the report of Mendell et al (2002),65 a 
10% to 14% reduction in communicable respiratory infections might result from improved work 
environments. Taking 12% as the median, we assumed that the transmission rates might drop to 100% −12% = 88% (range 86-90%) with implementing Guideline 8. Furthermore, the transmission rates among 
employees in contact-based positions were not affected by Guideline 9. Finally, in scenarios II, III, and 
IV, the transmission rates dropped to21.80% × 0.41% × 97.86% × 70% × 88% = 0.05%, 21.80% × 0.41% × 97.86% = 0.09% and 21.80% × 97.86% = 21.33% of their baseline values, 
respectively. See Table 2 for the adjusted transmission rates. 
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All the simulation results in this section were generated using the same set of initial values for simplicity. 
Taking the DELLTM center at Austin, Texas as an example, the total number of active workers after 
reopening could be around 14,000. The ratio between the on-site workers and the WFH workers was 
assumed as 2:1 (i.e., 9,333 on-site workers and 4,667 WFH workers). On the first day of reopening (day 
0), the proportion of silent carriers among all the 14,000 employees was approximated by the proportion 
of infections in the general population of U.S. estimated using the number of reported cases as of May 5, 
2020. The proportion of workers that had recovered from the infection and thus acquired immunity 
(referred as “recovered” in our model) were also estimated from the reported number of recoveries of the 
general U.S. population. The numbers of quarantined employees and death on day 0 were assumed to be 
0. We conducted the simulations for 200 days for Scenario I and 100 days for Scenarios II-IV to verify 
the short-term feasibility of reopening.  
 
As shown in Figures 4-6 for Scenario I, without implementing any of the guidelines, reopening merely 
led to a large number of infections and deaths (230 deaths by the last day, 649 quarantined and 422 silent 
carriers at their peaks in Figure 4). The prevalence of infections within the business entity exceeded that 
in the general population throughout the 200 days time window, and peaked at 114 infections per 1000 
people, which was 30 folds higher than that of the general population (Figures 5). Even by the end of the 
200 days, the within-entity prevalence was 8 folds higher (32.9 cases per 1,000 persons) than the 
population average. Also, even after we extended the simulation time window to 200 days, the 
transmission model still did not reach its steady states, suggesting a less predictable risk of disease 
transmission. In short, despite that the net profit remained positive (Figure 6), since the prevalence in 
workplace was constantly (much) higher than that in the general population, reopening turned out to be 
infeasible in Scenario I.  
 
If a business entity strictly followed all guidelines 1-9 as in Scenario II, the number of infections and 
deaths reduced remarkably, as shown in Figures 7-9 (2 deaths among 9,333 onsite workers, at most 16 
quarantined and 35 silent carriers as in Figure 7). Figure 7 also showed that the outcomes of the 
transmission model reached a plateau towards the end of the 100-days time window. In other words, the 
infection could be contained in this scenario, with the number of carriers and the number of the 
quarantined reaching and staying at 0 by day 48 and day 92, respectively. According to Figure 8, under 
the assumption that the prevalence of infections within the business entity was the same as in the general 
population at the beginning of reopening, the within-business prevalence dropped under the general 
population prevalence immediately (on day 2), and continuously decreased down to 0.035 infections per 
1,000 people by the last day of simulation. This within-business prevalence was 104 fold lower than the 
general population prevalence reported in other studies. The business also attained higher and more stable 
net profit than in Scenario I (Figure 9). 
 
In Scenario III, guidelines 5, 7, 8 were skipped and the transmission rate values changed accordingly (see 
Table 2); however, the simulation results were surprisingly similar to those in Scenario II during the 100-
day time window (Figures 10-12). Specifically, the numbers of deaths, the quarantined and silent carriers 
were nearly the same as those in Scenario II; also, it took approximately the same amount of time for the 
numbers of carriers and the quarantined to drop to 0 (Figure 10). The nearly same predicted population 
trajectories resulted in a nearly same prediction on net profit (Figure 12). To confirm such results, 
additional local sensitivity analysis was conducted at the parameter values in Scenarios II and III, 
suggesting that the simulation outputs were not sensitive to parameter value changes (e.g., a change of 
less than 0.1 in all the five output variables corresponding to 1% parameter value change).    
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After a business entity further dropped guideline 2 (Mask, glove, and goggle wearing while not alone) in 
Scenario IV, our model predicted that the spread of infections did not become uncontrollable within 100 
days but associated with a higher cost (Figures 13-15). While the initial within-business prevalence was 
the same as the general population prevalence, the workplace quickly became a “hot spot” of infection 
spreading, and a prevalence much higher than the population average was reached (Figure 14). The 
within-business prevalence continued to stay above the general population average for 11 days, and 
peaked at a level of 4 infections per 1,000 people on day 5. The results suggested that reopening should 
stop to prevent this entity from developing into a source of infection and posing significant risk on its 
workers as well as their close social contacts. Note that the within-business prevalence dropped to 0.09 
infections per 1,000 people by the end of the 100-day time window (Figure 14), and the numbers of 
deaths and the quarantined were controlled under 3 and 20 among 9,333 onsite workers, respectively. 
Business executives should not rely on such optimistic predictions and underestimate the infection risk 
for two reasons. First, constant parameter values were used in our simulations, which were not capable of 
capturing every possible time-varying characteristic of disease transmission over time (i.e., parameter 
values could be time-varying instead of being constant). Second, our simulation was performed under the 
assumption that all workers strictly followed the selected guidelines. In reality, it is unlikely that every 
single employee would faithfully stick to such rules and guidelines daily and constantly over time. 
Moreover, Figure 14 suggested that the use of PPE was very important at the early stage of reopening. In 
Scenarios II and III, with the use of PPE, we did not observe the rapid increase of prevalence since the 
beginning of reopening; however, in Scenario IV without the protection of PPE, the within-business 
prevalence started to increase and exceed the population average on day one. This result was consistent 
with the recent study by Kai et al (2020), 66 which demonstrated the significant effect of universal use of 
facial masks (e.g., at least 80% population wear masks) on impeding the spread of infections. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
SARS-CoV-2 struck the whole world since 2019 and caused significant loss of human lives and 
economy. While various lockdown, quarantine and isolation rules and polices worked effectively to 
control COVID infection transmission, numerous businesses were closed and tens of millions people lost 
their jobs. As of May 20, 2020, all the states in the U.S. strategically moved towards gradual reopening to 
save the economy. However, given that neither effective drug treatments nor vaccines were available, the 
risk of infection spreading within a business entity became a key issue that any business executive had to 
consider. In this study, an ODE-based transmission model was developed together with a net profit 
equation to quantitatively evaluate the trade-off among profit, cost, and infection risk within a business 
entity after reopening. Model parameter values were calibrated from heterogeneous sources to enable 
computer simulations. Both local and global sensitivity analyses were conducted to understand our model 
behavior and result robustness. Finally, a case study assessed scenarios, in which different combinations 
of behavioral and social practice guidelines were implemented. The simulation results suggested that 
infection transmission was controllable within a business entity and a positive net profit could be 
generated after reopening only if a combination of selected guidelines were implemented. Also, our 
results suggested that the use of PPE could be significantly important at the early stage of reopening to 
prevent infection spreading.      
We also recognize a number of limitations of this study. First, the mathematical model and the net profit 
equation were developed under multiple assumptions. While many of those assumptions are commonly 
adopted by related professional communities (e.g., epidemiology or mathematical modeling), some 
assumptions were introduced due to the lack of accurate and/or complete information (e.g., asymptomatic 
infection transmission rate). With additional efforts invested in future SARS-CoV-2 related research , we 
expect that informative and high-quality data will become available such that less assumptions are needed 
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and more accurate results can be generated by our approach. Second, while we have compiled 
information from many different sources to calibrate the possible ranges of model parameter values, the 
parameter uncertainty may not be completely characterized by such parameter ranges due to, e.g., the 
heterogeneity in population demographics, health conditions, behavioral patterns, and social networks. 
Third, although the costs associated with guidelines #1-9 were included in the net profit calculation, our 
cost estimation is subject to market fluctuations and many other (unpredictable) factors. It is thus 
suggested for users of our model to fine tune parameter values upon available business-specific data or 
information. Finally, in this study, herd immunity and vaccination strategies were not considered because 
they were not available as of the current moment. Considering the active research on SARS-CoV-2 
vaccine and drug development, the availability of effective vaccines and medications can be expected and 
it should be taken into consideration in our modeling work at some point.        
In summary, this modeling work provides a quantitative tool for decision-makers to explore and evaluate 
the business reopening option in the midst of COVID pandemics, and it can be extended to similar 
scenarios (e.g., outbreak of unknown or new virus) by re-calibrating related parameter values. We expect 
further research efforts in this direction to better prepare for possible strikes of infectious diseases in the 
future.   
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Figure 2 A. Local sensitivity analysis of the transmission model. 
18 
 
 
Figure 2 B. Local sensitivity analysis of the transmission model – Percentage on outcomes. 
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Figure 3. Global sensitivity analysis (PRCC) of the transmission model. 
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Figure 4. Outcome trajectories in the baseline scenario (Scenario I).  
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Figure 5. Reopening feasibility based on both net profit and infection prevalence – Scenario I.  
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Figure 6. Cost, profit and net profit – Scenario I.  
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Figure 7. Outcome trajectories in Scenario II.  
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Figure 8. Reopening feasibility based on both net profit and infection prevalence – Scenario II.  
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Figure 9. Cost, profit and net profit – Scenario II.  
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Figure 10.  Outcome trajectories in Scenario III.  
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Figure 11. Reopening feasibility based on both net profit and infection prevalence – Scenario III.  
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Figure 12. Cost, profit and net profit – Scenario III  
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Figure 13. Outcome trajectories in Scenario IV.  
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Figure 14. Reopening feasibility based on both net profit and infection prevalence – Scenario IV.  
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Figure 15. Cost, profit and net profit – Scenario IV.  
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Table 1. Variable and parameter definitions, values and sources. 
 
Notation Definition Unit Value Reference 
𝑆𝑆 Susceptible Persons   
𝐶𝐶 Carrier Persons   
𝑄𝑄 Quarantine Persons   
𝑅𝑅 Recovered Persons   
𝐷𝐷 Death Persons   
𝑁𝑁 Sum of S, C and R Persons   
𝑁𝑁𝛼𝛼  Number of employees in 
contact-based positions 
Persons   
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 Number of employees in non-
contact positions 
Persons   
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 Number of employees in non-
contact positions under 
quarantine 
Persons   
𝛼𝛼 Proportion of asymptomatic 
carriers among all types of 
carriers 
% 50 (13.8, 75) 15,26-30 
βO · κ The product of  βO and 𝜅𝜅 
 
day−1 3.10 × 10−7  
(2.42 × 10−7,3.88 × 10−7) 
32 
𝜅𝜅 
 
Probability of one employee 
having contacts with infected 
carriers outside a business 
entity 
% NA  
𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 Infection rate associated with 
activities outside of the 
business entity 
day−1 NA  
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴 Transmission rate of 
asymptomatic infection 
day−1 0.099  
(0.0103, 
0.814) 
Calibrated from 
14,44, 43 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 Transmission rate of 
presymptomatic and very-
mildly-symptomatic infection 
day−1 0.197  
(0.0333, 1.18) 
Calibrated from  
23, 25, 42 
𝜏𝜏 Rate of progression to 
symptomatic infection 
day−1person−1 0.192  
(0.143, 0.244) 
Calibrated from  
14,44 
𝜔𝜔 Rate of regression to carriage 
(e.g., even after treatment) 
day−1person−1 0.00172  
(0.000575, 
0.00455 
Calibrated from 
47,48 
𝛾𝛾 Clearance rate of symptomatic 
infection, including the 
portion of negative test 
outcomes among exposed 
employees 
day−1 0.0535 
(0.0178, 
0.141)  
6,20 
𝛿𝛿 Death rate due to infection  day−1 0.00320  Calibrated from  
33 
 
(0.00013, 
0.0167) 
25  
𝜌𝜌 Net profit per capita $ per person per 
day 
400.73 49 
𝑤𝑤 Average wage of employees $ per person per 
da 
218.60 51 
     
𝜉𝜉1 Social distancing % 67.4 12 
𝜉𝜉2 Personal protective equipment 
(PPE) 
$ per person per 
day 
3.60 53-55 
𝜉𝜉3 Routing sanitization $ per 
environmental 
service staff per 
day 
10.45 58 
𝜉𝜉4 COVID test $ per person per 
day 
0 assumed 
𝜉𝜉5 Non-contact thermometer $ per person per 
day 
(0.005, 0.01) 
 
56,57 
𝜉𝜉6 Case reporting and quarantine $ per person per 
day 
0  
𝜉𝜉7 Proportion of current hours of 
exposure to working 
environment 
% 70 (50, 100)  
𝜉𝜉8 Specific equipment for aerosol 
transmission (e.g., UVGI, 
HEPA filtration) 
$ per person per 
day 
0.874 54 
𝜉𝜉9 WFH $ per person per 
day 
0 assumed 
𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖:  Protection cost per person associated with the 𝑖𝑖-th Guideline; UVIG: ultraviolet germicidal 
irradiation; HEPA: high-efficiency particulate air filtration; 
 
  
34 
 
Table 2. Parameters value adjustment in different scenarios. 
 Scenario I 
(Baseline) 
Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV 
Guidelines  
Implemented 
None All 1,2,3,4,6,9 1,3,4,6,9 
𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 ∙ 𝜅𝜅  (% × day−1) 3.100 × 10−17  1.653 × 10−20 2.684 × 10−20 6.613 × 10−18 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴  (day−1) 0.099 5.280 × 10−05 8.571 × 10−05 2.112 × 10−02 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃  (day−1) 0.197 1.051 × 10−04 1.706 × 10−04 4.203 × 10−02 
 
